

United Nations, he was an articulate spokesman for the cause of human freedom throughout the world."

Senator ROBERT F. KENNEDY: "The man who set out to talk sense to the American people would not want us to mark his passing with the exaggerated praise that is so often the lot of public men. But the contributions of Adlai Stevenson to the United States and to the world can scarcely be exaggerated. Most of his adult life was spent in the service of government; all of it was spent in the service of the public."

Mayor Wagner: "Adlai Stevenson was a spokesman for humanity. His wisdom, warmth, and courage are a legend that will endure and grow with the years to come. He was one of New York City's beloved sons who, despite the great burden of his office, gave unstintingly of his time to scores of good causes. All of us in New York City join his millions of friends throughout the world in mourning his death."

Michael Stewart, British Foreign Secretary: "In the sudden death in London today of Mr. Adlai Stevenson the world has lost a great statesman. As an outstanding public figure in his own country, as a candidate for the U.S. Presidency and as Governor of Illinois he showed a liberality of mind and lucidity of expression which brought him universal renown."

Cardinal Spellman: "All the world must mourn the loss of a man so dedicated to the cause of peace as Adlai Stevenson. His death comes at a critical time when his remarkable talents and his tireless efforts for the betterment of mankind are sorely needed. I pray that God will reward his selfless service to others and that his soul may find eternal peace."

Sir Alec Douglas-Home, former British Prime Minister: "Adlai Stevenson will be mourned by his many friends and admirers in this country."

Lester B. Pearson, Canadian Prime Minister: "It is hard to exaggerate the importance of Adlai Stevenson to the free world or to his country. I can only express deep grief and deep shock at the news."

Jens Otto Krag, Danish Premier: "It was typical of Mr. Stevenson that that he was always ready to listen to what was being said by smaller countries. He was attentive not least to the views of the Nordic countries. The aim of his endeavor was a stable and just peace."

Mrs. Vijaya Lakshmi Pandit, former Indian Ambassador to the United States: "He stood for honor and justice among men and nations and his voice was the voice of reason in the United Nations."

The Reverend Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr.: "Our country should bow in reverence for the passing of a bright star from the horizon of world statesmanship. His leadership was a bright interlude in the troubled history of mankind."

Richard J. Hughes, Governor of New Jersey: "I know that the people of New Jersey share my grief on the loss of this conscientious and distinguished leader whose departure will be mourned by freedom-loving people throughout the world."

George W. Ball, Under Secretary of State: "He was one of my closest friends for 30 years. I am very stunned by this. No one ever had a more generous friend. He was a man of very great qualities."

Arthur J. Levitt, State controller: "The world has lost one of its most effective and eloquent spokesmen for peace and one of its great humanitarians."

Abraham D. Beame, city controller: "He was a man of great personal spirit, a man who contributed tremendously to liberal thinking in 20th century America."

Paul R. Screvane, city council president: "We, our city, our country, the world, have suffered a tremendous loss."

Representative WILLIAM F. RYAN: "In him was crystallized the best of a civilization."

Representative JOHN V. LINDSAY: "Adlai Stevenson's was the eloquent voice of reasoned liberalism and human rights here in America, and indeed, the voice of America's conscience to the entire world."

Robert Moses: "His was the American image we are proud to show as the symbol of democracy."

Dr. Grayson Kirk, president of Columbia University: "His was truly the global point of view, grounded in a profound love of his country and enlightened by compassion for all men."

Bishop Reuben H. Muller, president, National Council of Churches: "As citizens concerned for the promise of man, we mourn the loss of a great champion of man."

Rt. Rev. John E. Hines, presiding bishop of the Episcopal Church: "His image is that of the cultured, educated mind for whom fear held no decisive victory. He remained the kind of a man only the free world could produce."

Bishop Prince A. Taylor, Jr., president of the Council of Bishops of the Methodist Church: "He embodied in his life rare idealism and practical realities as only few men could have ever done."

Archbishop Iakovos, Greek Orthodox primate in the United States: "His passing is an irreparable loss."

Rabbi Maurice N. Eisendrath, president, Union of American Hebrew Congregations: "The world has lost one of its most valuable servants."

A DEFENSE OF THE U.S. SUPREME COURT

Mr. MOSS. Mr. President, in view of the tendency of many in the country to criticize the U.S. Supreme Court for its decisions—mainly, of course, because they do not agree with them—it is refreshing to find in one of our newspapers an eloquent statement defending the Court and pointing out to what extent it has, down through the years, guarded the liberties we all hold dear.

Such a statement appeared in the editorial columns of the Salt Lake Tribune, one of our great newspapers, on July 4 of this year.

I ask unanimous consent that the editorial be printed at this point in the CONGRESSIONAL RECORD.

There being no objection, the editorial was ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:

THESE MEN ALSO DEFENDED OUR LIBERTIES

On this 189th anniversary of the Declaration of Independence some Americans not hell-bent on the highways may pause to contemplate briefly our glorious heritage of freedom. Too few, however, will give adequate consideration and approbation to the third branch of Government for its part in safeguarding these precious liberties.

Praise for the Supreme Court is not abundant today. Many of the Independence Day orations, as in the past, may be highly critical of the tribunal which usually is most unpopular when it is most active.

"Paradoxically," says Leo Pfeffer, constitutional lawyer, in "This Honorable Court," a newly published book, "the institution least democratic in its structure—consisting of nine men serving for life and responsible to no one—has become the institution most committed to and effective in the promotion and preservation of democracy."

MOVES TO TRIM COURT POWER

Except for 1937, when the Court was under fire for decisions upsetting the New

Deal, a record number of measures to restrict the tribunal are now in Congress. Twenty-eight years ago the Justices were damned for obstructing legislative power. Now they are attacked for usurping legislative authority.

Hearings are underway in both Houses of Congress on proposals to protect State legislatures which the Court says are malapportioned. The hearings presage what may be the congressional battle of the century—or an exercise in futility. Ninety resolutions are in the House and five in the Senate which in effect seek to nullify the Supreme Court's "one man, one vote" decrees, most of them by constitutional amendment.

Cries of usurpation are not new. It was applied with vehemence on John Marshall, the fourth Chief Justice, and his associates who established once and for all the Court's authority for judicial review.

A REFEREE IS ESSENTIAL

Whatever the validity of original arguments against Marshall's interpretation of the Court's powers—and the painful doubts of thoughtful men today about recent decisions—it must be acknowledged that we must have some kind of referee. Our democracy needs judicial review as much to validate legislation as to invalidate it. Without some national body to determine validation and legitimacy, the Federal and State Governments would clash repeatedly, every department and bureau would encroach on its rivals, and no citizen would know where to look for legally binding rules.

This is judicial supremacy, to some extent, but in a democracy like ours, the people must agree to limit, channel, and discipline their own political behavior if the written Constitution is to endure and law prevent chaos. Judges are likely to err sometimes. They may err grievously. But who can propose a less fallible alternative system?

So-called judicial lawmaking is not new. John Quincy Adams said that Chief Justice Marshall settled more questions of constitutional law than all the Presidents. And De Tocqueville noted in the 1830's that practically every political question in the United States sooner or later becomes a judicial question.

ISSUES THRUST ON COURT

For the Warren court, the Bill of Rights, almost forgotten for a long time, is the heart of the Constitution. In the 1935-36 term, the Supreme Court dealt with civil liberties in only two out of 160 written opinions. In the 1960-61 term, 54 of the 120 written opinions handed down dealt with civil rights.

Failure of the executive and legislative branches to meet their responsibility for basic freedoms contributed to the Supreme Court's emergence as guardian and defender of civil liberties. By indirectly thrusting upon the Court delicate problems more properly their own, the elected branches have forced the judicial branch to take action. Judicial intervention resulted mainly from the necessity of filling a vacuum. Though it may have gone too far in some cases, the Court very likely has saved our Republic.

The Declaration of Independence paved the way for our Nation. The freedoms for which patriots fought and died were embodied in the Constitution which established the government of checks and balances. These checks and balances have been the supreme merit of the American revolution—still going on—and the secret of its success.

Fe (Om) Moss
WHY WE MUST STAY IN VIETNAM

Mr. MOSS. Mr. President, an argument the other night between a Salt Lake City attorney and his son resulted in one of the best and most factual de-

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fenses of the administration's policies in Vietnam I have seen.

It came about this way. The Salt Lake attorney, Sanford M. Stoddard, who is a good friend of mine, favors completely the administration policy in southeast Asia. His son, Ray, who was graduated from Stanford University this June with an A.B. in history, does, too. But, for the sake of an argument, Sanford Stoddard took the position that the United States has no business in Vietnam, and should pull out. Ray presented the case for the Johnson policies. When the argument was completed, Ray felt he had not fully convinced his father, so he put his arguments down on paper. The result was a hard-hitting, factual statement which I commend to my colleagues. I ask unanimous consent that it be printed at this point in the CONGRESSIONAL RECORD, with thanks to the well-informed young man who prepared it.

There being no objection, the statement was ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:

WHY WE MUST STAY IN VIETNAM
(By Ray Stoddard)

The United States is compelled to fight a dirty little war in South Vietnam, not because national interests are directly at stake in the area, but because this country is engaged in a larger conflict—the cold war. Properly, the Vietnamese engagement should be regarded as one battle in the cold war. It cannot be a decisive battle, but it is one which may profoundly affect the outcome of the larger conflict. It may well prove to be a turning point in the struggle for the control of southeast Asia and possibly for the control of all of Asia.

If the Communists should win in South Vietnam, the victory is likely to produce the following results:

1. The Communists will be encouraged to continue their aggressive policies in southeast Asia. They will undoubtedly mount subversive campaigns against Thailand and Malaysia and the Chinese may be encouraged to make some sort of aggressive moves against India, Formosa, or Korea.

2. U.S. allies in the area will become discouraged. If the United States proves unable or unwilling to defend South Vietnam against Communist aggression, Thailand and Malaysia, and perhaps even Japan, will have no reason to believe that the United States will defend them against similar aggression. Thus, our allies in Asia may feel obliged to make their peace with China before it is too late.

3. The Communists will have won an immense psychological victory among both the intellectuals and the masses. Already, communism has a strong appeal for the intellectuals because its successes in China have convinced many of them that it is the only possible solution for the problems of Asia. A Communist victory in South Vietnam will greatly strengthen this belief. The most common motivation for political allegiance in Asia is not the question of who is right, but that of who will win. And if China wins in South Vietnam, a great many Asians will inevitably decide that China will be the winner in Asia. Thus, they will rush to jump on the band wagon.

Therefore, South Vietnam has a symbolic value similar to that of Czechoslovakia in 1937 and Korea in 1950. If Great Britain and France had opposed Hitler in 1937, World War II might have started then. On the other hand, it might have been prevented. Similarly, if the United States opposes China's expansion into southeast Asia, a larger war may break out. On the other hand, the larger war may be prevented.

The example of Korea, it is submitted, tends to support the argument that a strong stand in South Vietnam will discourage future friction between the United States and China. The Korean war was not decisive in terms of land control. Nor did it prove that the United States could defeat the Chinese army. It did demonstrate to China that the United States would oppose any act of open aggression in Asia. In consequence, the Chinese have not attempted any comparable acts of aggression since 1950, those in Tibet and India being relatively insignificant.

Instead, the Chinese have developed the tactic of indirect aggression. In areas like South Vietnam and Laos, Communist supported guerrillas foment unrest, exploit ignorance and poverty, wage war, and, the Communists hope, undermine the governments. In the long run this subversive movement is more dangerous to the United States than the Korea style invasion. It is just as effective and much more difficult to defeat.

Therefore, the United States was bound to attempt to halt this campaign before it became too late. The only question was where. The Eisenhower administration decided against Laos: the situation was too far gone, the Communists had too great a strategic advantage, and the logistical problem of supporting a war in the area was virtually insoluble. The Kennedy administration, however, decided that the Communists could be stopped in South Vietnam. The situation there seemed to be better. The Diem government appeared to be relatively stable and determined to defeat the Communists. Its army seemed to be relatively strong, while the Vietcong seemed to be relatively weak. The strategic situation was certainly much better.

The Diem regime, however, proved to be rotten at the core. Within the first 2 years of the U.S. involvement, that government collapsed and plunged the country into a period of political instability from which it has not yet emerged. Moreover, the Vietcong proved to be much stronger than expected. Once the U.S. efforts became hampered with political problems, the Vietcong launched a larger and more aggressive offensive. At the present time, it is a much more dangerous enemy than it was in 1960. It is better armed, it is operating in larger units, it is bolder and more aggressive, and it is winning greater victories. To make matters worse, the South Vietnamese resistance is in much greater danger of collapse.

The original Kennedy policy proved to be inadequate. President Johnson was forced to either abandon the war or to increase U.S. involvement. The course of abandonment, however, would have involved a serious defeat for U.S. foreign policy. This country had committed itself too deeply to the winning of the war. A retreat would have cost the United States all of southeast Asia. It would have signified that the Vietcong—an army of only about 100,000 men—had beaten the United States. In the eyes of Asians, this country would have been exposed as a paper tiger. The Communists would have no reason to fear its strength, and its allies would have no reason to trust in its aid.

Of course, there is always the question of how much the control of southeast Asia is worth. The answer is that it is worth a great deal. Strategically, the area controls the air and sea routes between the Far East and Europe and the Near East. Moreover, military control of the area endangers Pakistan and India to the west, Australia to the south and the Philippines to the east. And, on the other hand, it secures the southern border of China.

But, more important, Communist control of southeast Asia would psychologically endanger the U.S. position throughout all of Asia. In fact, it would endanger

that position throughout the world. To the Asians, China would look like a winner and the United States would look like a loser. No country can afford to build its destiny on the basis of allegiance with a loser. Many countries now friendly to us would at least be forced into the neutralist camp, since China would certainly emerge from a victory in South Vietnam as the only major power in a very great area of the world. In the case of Japan, our strongest friend in the area, it would probably mean a shift of economic and political ties from the direction of the United States to the direction of China.

Of a certainty, a defeat in southeast Asia would put the United States on the defensive. The Chinese would be bound to exploit their victory to the fullest extent. So they would continue to test us. Their hope would be that when the time comes for decisive conflict we will be in a weaker position in southeast Asia and they in a much stronger one.

But where shall the United States stand and fight after southeast Asia is lost? Thailand and Malaysia are two of our closest allies outside of Europe, the Americas, Australia, and New Zealand, the Philippines and Japan. If southeast Asia is lost, the Philippines will not be worth defending, even if the Government will trust us to defend the country.

Thus, if southeast Asia is not worth defending, there is very little left in the world which is both worth defending and defendable. Therefore, a retreat from southeast Asia could easily result in our fighting another war anyway, in an unfavorable setting, after losing control of a very valuable area of land. Or, on the other hand, it might result in confinement of the Western World to their own tiny citadels, surrounded by the hungry, Communist controlled masses of the world. In such a situation, the West might simply be overrun.

Can we win the war if we do continue the fight in Vietnam? The answer is probably no. The Vietcong is too deeply entrenched in the country to be driven out. But failing to win does not mean that we must lose. If we maintain the determination to fight, the Communists cannot drive us out of Vietnam. The Vietcong simply hasn't the strength. In the end a stalemate must result. A stalemate must inevitably be solved at the conference tables.

If the United States can gain a favorable enough settlement in Vietnam, its cost will have been justified. We will not have won this particular battle but we will have prevented the Communists from winning it. Thus, this country will be in a better position to win the war. The Communists can be stopped on the more favorable grounds of Thailand and Malaysia, if we first: (1) demonstrate to the Communists that we are determined to resist their offensive; (2) demonstrate to our allies that we can be trusted to protect them, even when the going gets rough; (3) demonstrate to both the intellectuals and to the masses that the issue is at least in doubt and that they need not rush to the banner of communism.

COMMENCEMENT ADDRESS AT
WHITTIER COLLEGE BY SENATOR
SMITH

Mr. MURPHY. Mr. President, the Golden State of California was brightened on June 12 by the presence of the distinguished and gracious lady from Maine, Mrs. MARGARET CHASE SMITH. The occasion was her commencement address to the 62d graduating class of Whittier College in Whittier, Calif. It is important to note that the Senator's commencement address was delivered immediately prior to casting her 2,000th consecutive rollcall vote on June 14.

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then part of the Alamogordo bombing range; now it is part of the larger White Sands missile range.

General Farrell spoke of the times, in the First World War, when, as a young lieutenant, he stood with a foot on the step, waiting to lead his men out of the trench into combat. "That," he said, "was nothing like what we have just been through."

He said that the end of the war was now near; perhaps, he added, the end of all such wars. What we had just been through was the explosion of the first atomic bomb. It had not been a dud.

At the base camp, I worked with General Groves on the technical results of the test for his report to Secretary Stimson in Potsdam; for him, for the President, probably for Churchill, perhaps for some talk with Stalin. Later, Vannevar Bush spoke with me; he knew that we hoped that our Government would take up with the Allied governments the future problems of the bomb, the future hope of collaboration and indeed the use of the bombs in the Pacific war. Bush told me that this had been decided. Nothing much like that was to happen; but neither of us then knew it.

In the morning air, most of us shared, clearly with no grounds for confidence, the two hopes of which General Farrell spoke. For a year, with the imminent defeat of the Axis in Europe and the growing weakness of the Japanese in the Pacific, more and more we had thought of the peril and the hope that our work would bring to human history: the peril of these weapons and their almost inevitable vast increase; and the hope of limiting and avoiding war, and of new patterns and institutions of international cooperation, insight, and understanding.

AN ANGRY JAPANESE

There was no such simple sense 3 weeks later, with the use of the bombs in Japan and the end of the war, marked by this final cruel slaughter. Much has been written on the wisdom of those actions, and on imagined alternatives. I would not add again to this debate, but would make one comment.

In Hiroshima in August 1945, there was a hospital for postal and telegraphic workers. Day by day, Dr. Hachiya, who was in charge of it, kept a diary. He was himself hurt by the explosion, but managed to get back to his hospital. He wrote of the dying who came there, the burned and the mutilated, and of the sickness, not at first clear to him, caused by radiation: often the injured recovered, and others, not seemingly hurt at all, sickened and died.

There is no outrage or anger in these pages. But in one entry Dr. Hachiya is angry: he had heard the rumor of an imperial rescript in which the Emperor asked the Japanese Government to end the war. It was not only the generals and the Kamikaze who were determined to fight to the death.

If we should speak of regret, we should remember that these considerations, looking to the end of the war and toward the future, were not those that led to the initiation of serious work on the bomb. Already in 1939, in this country, Szilard, with help from Wigner and with the support of Einstein, indicated to our Government the possible importance of the uranium project, its possible military use.

In England, Peteris and Frisch, like their American colleagues refugees from tyranny, addressed similar pleas to the Government of the United Kingdom. Peteris' work had a clarity and firmness of program at the time unmatched in this country. He thought that he knew how to make a bomb; he was quite sure that it would work.

It was not until the autumn of 1941 that

Arthur Compton, Fermi, Lawrence, and Oppenheimer, the scientific panel to the Secretary of War's Interim Committee on Atomic Problems.

serious consideration was given here to making a bomb; it was not until then that the British had seen that our help was needed and that they could not go it alone. Then, just before Pearl Harbor, with El Alamein and Stalingrad still a year away and the defeat of the Axis far from assured, we did get to work. I think it a valid ground for regret that those 2 years were lost, 2 years of slaughter, degradation, and despair.

THE MOOD OF HOPE

The last two decades have been shadowed by danger, ever changing, never really receding. Looking to the future, I see again no ground for confidence; but I do see hope.

The mood of hope is not as bright today as 2 years ago. Then, after the crisis in Cuba, President Kennedy spoke at American University and Pope John XXIII wrote his "Pacem in Terris," giving the noblest and most rounded expression of what we vaguely thought 20 years earlier in the desert.

But it is not the mood of hope, but hope itself, that is part of our life, and thus part of our duty. We are engaged in this great enterprise of our time, testing whether men can both preserve and enlarge life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness, and live without war as the great arbiter of history.

This we knew early in the morning of July 16, 20 years ago.

For Case
VIETNAM

Mr. CASE. Mr. President, it is apparent from developments in the past 72 hours that the Congress and the people of the United States will shortly be confronted with new decisions respecting Vietnam.

President Johnson spoke Tuesday of new and serious decisions in the making, and the Secretary of Defense intimated Wednesday that these decisions would be forthcoming upon his return from Saigon next week.

All indications point to requests by the President for additional defense appropriations and—more importantly—specific legislative authority to call up a large number of reservists and to extend the terms of service of members of the Active Forces.

These are grave steps for the country and will affect directly the lives and families of thousands of our citizens.

The stage is thus being set for congressional and public review of the course of the war in Vietnam, the deepening involvement of the United States in that war, and the assumptions upon which the administration is proceeding with respect to our proclaimed goal of a peaceful settlement.

I have taken the position that, so long as our military operations remain compatible with our stated objective of negotiations, there has been no real alternative to our present course—and I have supported that course.

Now that we are to be asked, in all probability, for a fresh mandate, we shall look to the President to give us a full account both of the existing situation in Vietnam and of his administration's aims. We, in the Congress, must and will examine his proposals with the utmost care and deliberation.

BIG BROTHER: SNOOPING BY INTERNAL REVENUE SERVICE

Mr. LONG of Missouri. Mr. President, during the past few days, the Subcom-

mittee on Administrative Practice and Procedure has been holding hearings on snooping techniques of the Internal Revenue Service.

Although I am becoming hardened at the revelations made by Federal officials when put under oath on this subject, even I was appalled at the confirmation of some of the items that our staff had found.

Frankly, when my staff counsel first told me that IRS had permanent bugs and secret cameras planted in its own conference rooms, I was very skeptical.

My skepticism turned out to be misplaced as Mr. Sheldon Cohen, Commissioner of Internal Revenue, admitted under oath to such bugged rooms on IRS premises in such widely scattered places as Baltimore, Kansas City, Alexandria, Va., and New York City.

When I was told that IRS in Pittsburgh used a disguised telephone company truck to look inconspicuous when they went on wiretapping expeditions, I was even more skeptical; after all, IRS had banned all wiretapping for years.

Again, I was wrong, IRS had such a truck and used it for just such illegal purposes.

The revelations went on and on.

Next Monday we will begin 3 days of hearings on the situation in the Boston area.

At this time, Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent to print at this point in the RECORD several news stories outlining what we found in Pittsburgh.

There being no objection, the articles were ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:

[From the St. Louis Post-Dispatch, July 14, 1965]

WITNESS SAYS IRS HEADQUARTERS HELPED IN PITTSBURGH WIRETAP—WASHINGTON SENT EQUIPMENT, EXPERT, SENATORS ARE TOLD

(By James C. Millstone, a Washington correspondent of the Post-Dispatch)

WASHINGTON, July 14.—Internal Revenue Service headquarters in Washington sent equipment and an expert technician to install two wiretaps in the Pittsburgh area, congressional investigators were told today.

Cresson O. Davis, Chief of the IRS Intelligence Division in Pittsburgh, gave the testimony at a hearing by the Senate Subcommittee on Administrative Practice and Procedure, headed by Senator EDWARD V. LONG, Democrat, of Missouri. The subcommittee is devoting its attention currently to IRS practices.

Davis said that he had a part in authorizing both wiretaps although he knew such action was against IRS regulations. Both cases, he said, involved investigations of organized crime operations.

He said that he knew of two instances in which Pittsburgh IRS agents used hidden microphones to record conversations with persons not involved in organized crime. Both were efforts to obtain evidence about falsified tax returns, Davis said.

When LONG asked whether it was IRS procedure to ignore constitutional rights of citizens, Davis said that the use of microphones "was not invasion of their rights as I understand it." LONG said, "That is a debatable question."

Davis said his instructions from IRS Commissioner Sheldon S. Cohen on protecting the names of certain individuals from public exposure prohibited him from answering. He had declined to answer previous questions for the same reason.

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Long said Davis' refusal was "blocking our investigation" and questioned whether Cohen "is authorized to do that" through his orders to witnesses. Long recessed the hearing until later in the day and asked that Cohen be recalled for questioning. The IRS Commissioner and Attorney General Nicholas Katzenbach testified yesterday.

TAPPED BOOKIE PHONES

Davis, flanked by two attorneys, said the wiretaps he authorized were set up in 1961 and 1964. The first was at an establishment in Wheeling, W. Va., that he said was "book-keeping headquarters of a nationwide (gambling) syndicate."

A tap was placed on a bank of 8 to 10 telephones in an effort to determine whether the Mannarino gambling operation in Pittsburgh was laying off bets there, Davis said. Agents listened at a nearby location and recorded conversations from the telephone lines, he said.

After a few days they detected no connection between the Wheeling and Pittsburgh operations and turned over the information to the West Virginia IRS office, he said.

The second tap was placed in the greater Pittsburgh area in an effort to learn of pick-up points in the city's number rackets, Davis said. However, he refused to say whose telephone was tapped or where the listening post was, contending that the answers would violate Cohen's instructions.

TECHNICIAN INSTALLED TAP

In both cases, Davis testified, he called the Washington office and requested the wiretap equipment. Both times, a technician took the equipment to Pittsburgh and installed it, he said.

Asked whether he had any hesitancy about calling Washington on the subject, because wiretapping was against IRS regulations, Davis said:

"I knew there were people in the Washington office experienced technically in such matters."

Long expressed astonishment that wiretap equipment would be kept in Washington.

"Well, that's where we got it," Davis replied.

"Was there a general understanding that you could violate wiretap regulations whenever you wanted to?" Long asked.

"No, sir," Davis responded, "only under the most extreme circumstances."

TELLS OF CRIME DRIVE

He described those as cases in the campaign against organized crime in which information could not be obtained in any other way and in which potential witnesses were too terrorized to talk.

Davis disclosed that IRS agents were being trained in use of wiretapping equipment, explaining:

"Training in such matters is a defense against the opposition. The racket element also is engaged in this activity, and they are not bound by these rules."

"I once was told that my phone was tapped. I don't know if it was or not. I had it checked darn quick and it wasn't then."

On the subject of hidden microphones, Davis said that such equipment was carried by Pittsburgh IRS agents when they had information they were to be the victims of a frame attempt by racket or police elements, or when agents could be exposed to danger.

USE IN ORDINARY CASES

Long asked whether a hidden transmitter ever was used to record conversations of "ordinary people," observing that IRS should not "use organized crime as the justification for any surveillance they want to use."

"I know of two instances where we attempted to record conversations with individuals not in the organized crime drive," Davis said. "We felt it was the one means

of obtaining evidence about falsified returns."

The testimony foundered when Long asked, "Can you tell us about a tap you ran into your own basement?"

Davis declined to answer, then consulted with his attorneys. He said he never listened to a tap set in his home, but he refused repeated questions by Long as to whether the equipment was established there.

Joseph McCarthy, Davis' private attorney, told Long that the question involved delicate matters and that by answering it and other questions about particular investigations, Davis might jeopardize his own job as well as the reputations of others.

One witness late yesterday told the subcommittee that he learned accidentally that a conference room used by IRS agents in Pittsburgh to interrogate taxpayers was equipped with a hidden two-way mirror.

Robert J. Arnold, a certified public accountant, said he was in the room with a client when someone knocked down a picture of the Statue of Liberty with an American flag superimposed. Behind the picture was a two-way mirror, he said. From the conference room, the device looked like a mirror; from the other side, however, agents were able to observe the room.

Arnold said he had heard there was a microphone concealed in the room but did not see it. Fensterwald interjected that the microphone was concealed in the wall. He said that on occasion IRS used a framed picture of its seal to cover concealed microphones and two-way mirrors.

Commissioner Cohen acknowledged earlier that two-way mirrors and hidden microphones were used in some IRS offices. He said that although present laws permit use of those devices, criticism of such tactics outweighed the benefits to IRS, and he had ordered them abandoned.

[From the Washington (D.C.) Evening Star, July 15, 1965]

PROBERS DEMAND DATA ON BUGGING BY IRS
(By Philip Shandler)

Internal Revenue Service Commissioner Sheldon S. Cohen today faced a challenge to either let Senate probers see confidential affidavits given him by undercover agents or make a command appearance himself.

The choice was posed yesterday by Senator Edward V. Long, Democrat, of Missouri, as his Judiciary Subcommittee ended the second day of hearings on IRS activities in the Pittsburgh area.

Two special agents and the head of the Intelligence Division in Pittsburgh provided new details of wiretapping and other snoop-ing activities.

But they refused to supply names and places Long considers essential to a thorough investigation. And they raised new questions with testimony indicating that:

The Washington headquarters has been teaching wiretapping and supplying wiretap equipment to its field offices despite a long-standing regulation against wiretapping. Cohen said Tuesday that he had only recently learned of wiretapping by agents in Pittsburgh.

U.S. tax agents in Pennsylvania have ignored laws against wiretapping and breaking and entering in their zeal to obtain information about suspected lawbreakers in the fields of gambling and vice.

Pittsburgh agents have "bugged" rooms that could yield personal information about "ordinary citizens" as well as about possible racketeers.

1961 CASE CITED

The Pittsburgh intelligence chief, Cresson O. Davis, told Long the national office in 1961 sent Special Agent Burke Yung to help install a telephone tap in Wheeling, W. Va., during an investigation of a possible "layoff"

operation for gamblers in New Kensington, Pa.

"Why do they have experts in wiretapping if they have a regulation against it?" Long asked.

"I'm not qualified to say," Davis replied.

Yung also brought the equipment used in the tapping of three telephone lines last year, Davis said, when his office was probing reputed attempts to extort money from numbers racketeers.

Davis refused, however, to give Long the name of the person whose lines were tapped.

"Is he a policeman by the name of McDonald?" asked Subcommittee Counsel Bernard Fensterwald, Jr.

Davis said he could not answer because a directive issued by Cohen on Monday barred testimony that could jeopardize the rights or security of agents or citizens not previously named in proceedings of record.

Long at that point unexpectedly recessed the hearing and summoned Cohen to appear. When the afternoon session opened he announced that an understanding had been reached, and that Davis would testify more fully. But the afternoon testimony moved the Senator to call for elaboration today.

SECRET MICROPHONE

Long wanted to know, for example, why a secret microphone installed in a revenue service office in Pittsburgh in 1961 could not be used to overhear conversations between a taxpayer and his counsel.

"We've never done that," Davis said. "We have never used it for ordinary citizens."

But he acknowledged that the room was used to question ordinary citizens and criminal suspects alike.

Long was even more struck by agents' description of how the law office of the late Vincent Massock, of Washington, Pa., was "bugged." Massock was suspected of having connections with the Cosa Nostra, Davis said.

Special Agent Jack Schwartz testified that he got a passkey from the building superintendent on the pretense of wanting to get into another office which the IRS had rented.

He made a "fast impression" of the key in clay, had a copy made, used it to enter the office at night and—again with the help of agents from Washington—attached a small microphone to a bookcase.

ADmits VIOLATIONS

Schwartz acknowledged that he had violated both the State law against wiretapping and the breaking-and-entering statutes. But he declared:

"Those of us in the organized crime drive felt proud to be in it. Anything that would have been asked, I would have done it."

Ironically, the bug fell face down and was swamped with noise from Muzak and an air conditioner, Schwartz said. About 2 weeks later, agents again entered the office to remove it, he said.

The two agents' testimony aroused Senator HUGH SCOTT, Republican, of Pennsylvania, who is a member of the parent Senate Judiciary Committee.

"How do you justify violating the constitutional rights of a person and the attorney-client relationship?" he asked.

Davis replied that any "incidental" information picked up by the microphone would not have been used.

The two agents, as well as Special Agent William D. Marsh and a clerk from the Pittsburgh office, Dante Amobile, described the wiretap use of a truck painted to look like a telephone-repair vehicle.

According to their testimony, a discarded Bell Telephone Co. truck was bought from a used car dealer with \$300 supplied by the national office. The 1-ton vehicle was originally obtained for surveillance, but last year was used once in wiretapping.

In that case, a wireless bug was attached to a telephone line leading to an unidentified

"(b) In addition to the number of fellowships authorized to be awarded by subsection (a) of this section, the Commissioner is authorized to award fellowships equal to the number previously awarded during any fiscal year under this part but vacated prior to the end of the period for which they were awarded; except that each fellowship awarded under this subsection shall be for such period of study, not in excess of the remainder of the period for which the fellowship which it replaces was awarded, as the Commissioner may determine.

"Fellowships for Recent Graduates

"Sec. 522. One-half the number of fellowships under the provisions of this part for any fiscal year shall be awarded by the Commissioner to persons recommended to the Commissioner for such fellowships by institutions of higher education. An institution of higher education may for the purposes of this section recommend any individual who has received a bachelor's degree with high standing from such institution, except that such recommendation shall be made not later than six months after the awarding of such degree.

"Fellowships for Experienced Teachers

"Sec. 523. The remaining half of the number of fellowships awarded under the provisions of this part for any fiscal year shall be awarded by the Commissioner to persons with at least six academic years of experience teaching in an elementary, secondary, or postsecondary vocational school, who are recommended to the Commissioner for such fellowships by local educational agencies. A local educational agency may, for the purposes of this section, recommend any such person who is teaching in such agency's elementary, secondary, or postsecondary vocational schools upon condition that such agency agree to rehire such individual upon his completing the course of study under such fellowship.

"Fellowships in Ancillary Fields

"Sec. 524. Not less than 20 per centum of the fellowships awarded under sections 522 and 523 shall be awarded to persons for graduate work in fields ancillary to elementary and secondary education, as defined in section 521.

"Distribution of Fellowships

"Sec. 525. In awarding fellowships under the provisions of this part the Commissioner shall endeavor to provide an equitable distribution of such fellowships throughout the Nation, except that to the extent he deems proper in the national interest, the Commissioner shall give preference in such awards to persons already serving, or who intend to serve, in elementary or secondary schools in low-income rural or metropolitan areas.

"Stipends

"Sec. 526. (a) Each person awarded a fellowship under the provisions of section 522 shall receive a stipend of \$2,000 for the first academic year of study and \$2,200 for the second such year. Each person awarded a fellowship under the provisions of section 523 shall receive a stipend of \$4,800 for each academic year of study. In both cases an additional amount of \$400 for each such academic year of study shall be paid to each such person on account of each of his dependents.

"(b) In addition to the amount paid to persons pursuant to subsection (a) there shall be paid to the institution of higher education at which each such person is pursuing his course of study, \$2,500 per academic year in the case of a person receiving a fellowship pursuant to section 522 and \$5,000 per academic year in the case of a person receiving a fellowship pursuant to section 523. Amounts paid pursuant to this subsection shall be less any amount charged any such person for tuition.

"(c) The Commissioner shall reimburse any person awarded a fellowship pursuant to this part for actual and necessary traveling expenses of such person and his dependents from his ordinary place of residence to the institution of higher education where he will pursue his studies under such fellowship, and to return to such residence.

"Limitation

"Sec. 527. No fellowship shall be awarded under this part for study at a school or department of divinity. For the purposes of this section, the term 'school or department of divinity' means an institution or department or branch of an institution, whose program is specifically for the education of students to prepare them to become ministers of religion or to enter upon some other religious vocation or to prepare them to teach theological subjects.

"Fellowship Conditions

"Sec. 528. A person awarded a fellowship under the provisions of this part shall continue to receive the payments provided in section 526(a) only during such periods as the Commissioner finds that he is maintaining essentially full time to, study or research in the field in which such fellowship was awarded, in an institution of higher education, and is not engaging in gainful employment other than part-time employment by such institution in teaching, research, or similar activities, approved by the Commissioner.

"Appropriations

"Sec. 529. There are authorized to be appropriated such amounts as may be necessary to carry out the provisions of this part."

On page 71, line 20, strike out "TITLE V" and insert in lieu thereof "TITLE VI".

Beginning on page 71, redesignate sections 501 through 504 as sections 601 through 604, respectively.

On page 73, between lines 12 and 13, add the following new subsection:

"(g) The term 'local educational agency' means a public board of education or other public authority legally constituted within a State for either administrative control or direction of, or to perform a service function for, public elementary, secondary, or postsecondary vocational schools in a city, county, township, school district, or other political subdivision of a State, or such combination of school districts or counties as are recognized in a State as an administrative agency for its public elementary, secondary, or postsecondary vocational schools. Such term also includes any other public institution or agency having administrative control and direction of a public elementary, secondary, or postsecondary vocational school."

Fe from Morse
U.S. POLICY IN VIETNAM

Mr. MORSE. Mr. President, yesterday I sent to the Press Gallery mimeographed copies of the speech I shall make today. It is an additional speech, added to a long list of speeches I have made in the last 2 years on this floor in opposition to the unjustified slaughtering of American boys in Asia by this administration in an undeclared and unconstitutional and illegal war.

At the very beginning of my speech today, I ask for the attention of the reservationists in the Senate. By the term "reservationists" in the Senate, my colleagues well know I mean those Senators who, not so long ago, when the President asked for \$700 million to be used in the war in Vietnam, voted for the measure, although the President made it clear to us on two occasions, once in

the East Room in the White House and the second time in the message itself, that he did not need \$700 million, because he had plenty of authority to transfer the necessary funds; but that he was using the measure as a vehicle for another vote of confidence for his policy in Asia.

A group of Senators stood here and made speeches which caused me to label them as the speeches of reservationists. They wanted their reservations noted, that they were not giving the President a blank check. They wanted their reservations noted that they wanted to be consulted if the President should send further American troops to southeast Asia; and that they expected to be taken into consultation in connection with a further escalation of the war.

The Record will show that the senior Senator from Oregon that afternoon warned them for the last time so far as the power called for by the measure was concerned.

So I again ask the question on the floor of the Senate. I would like to have any Senator tell me whether the President has consulted him about the additional thousands of American boys he has sent into southeast Asia, since the passing of the so-called \$700 million measure, who are dying by increasing numbers as this escalated war proceeds.

Of course they have not been consulted. I say to my colleagues in the Senate and to the President of the United States and his Cabinet that the American people, in due course of time, are going to be heard from, expressing their deep resentment in opposition to what I consider to be a failure on the part of this administration to follow the procedures of the Constitution of the United States in regard to making war.

I have been heard to say many times, but I shall continue to be heard to say across the land and to the Senate, that our President has no constitutional authority to send a single American boy to his death in Asia in the absence of a declaration of war. The Congress of the United States does not have a scintilla of constitutional right to seek to delegate to the President of the United States the power to make war in the absence of a declaration of war.

The Constitution is too precious, and I happen to believe that this administration should be stopped by the Congress in conducting an undeclared war. The American Government should face up to the issue as to whether under article I, section 8, of the Constitution, it is ready to declare a war, for only the Congress can declare a war. There is not a single basis for a constitutional interpretation in the lawbooks of America that justify Congress seeking to delegate power to the President to make war in the absence of a declaration of war.

There are those who do not like to hear me say it, but I believe there are probably two main reasons why there has not been a declaration of war.

First, it would then make the war issue squarely an issue before the American people: "Do you want to make war formally and declare it?" Any such recommendation by the President of the United States and any such declaration

of war resolution introduced in the Congress would so split this body politic, so far as public opinion is concerned, that the President would take little relief and little comfort from the polls that he so frequently pulls out of his pocket as an indication that the public is behind him in bloodletting.

The public, like the senior Senator from Oregon, likes the President. The public, like the senior Senator from Oregon, would like to support the President on every issue. The senior Senator from Oregon supports him on the overwhelming majority of issues, at least 95 percent of them. But as a friend of the President, I believe I can best show that friendship, when I disagree with the President, to say when I think he is wrong, as he is in connection with his foreign policy in connection with this illegal, unjustifiable war in southeast Asia.

The American people are entitled to have their Congress act in accordance with the Constitution in support or rejection of a declaration of war.

Second, it would be difficult to know against whom to declare war. At the present time, the only country we could possibly present as a basis against which to direct a declaration of war would be North Vietnam. But, as I have stated many times in past months, on the basis of the present facts, if a proposed declaration of war against North Vietnam came before this body, I would vote against such a declaration; in my judgment, we do not have the slightest justification under international law, or in keeping with our signature on existing treaties, or on the basis of the operative facts in Asia, to declare war against any country. On the contrary, on the basis of international law, of treaty obligations, and of the serious threat to the peace of the world which we are helping to create in Asia, we should reverse our course of action and plead with other nations to join us under the procedures of the United Nations to set up a peace conference, with the United States sitting at the head of that peace table in an endeavor to carry out our professed ideal of substituting the rule of law for what has become the American jungle claw for the settlement of the dispute in Asia.

Mr. President, I wish to say that again because I would not wish anyone in the Senate or in the country to think that I, in the slightest degree, have modified my position of some 2 years in opposition to our Government's policies in Asia.

In my judgment, those policies will go down in history to the everlasting discredit of the Johnson administration. If the President does not change those policies, he will leave a blot on what otherwise will be the record of a great President.

With those comments as a preface, I now turn to the manuscript of my speech, setting forth the points I wish to emphasize in addition today.

ESCALATIONS IN VIETNAM TYPIFY ALL WARS

With the statements made Tuesday by President Johnson at his news conference, the United States and the world slid further into the morass of war. It is in-

teresting to note that our new escalation is being justified on the basis of alleged increases in participation in the war by North Vietnam. Yet, the testimony of much of our Government suggests that the infiltration from the north was stepped up in 1964, after the American raids on North Vietnam naval bases, subsequent to the Tonkin Bay incidents.

Let me point out that the administration can never escape its responsibilities for exceeding its rights in connection with the Tonkin Bay incidents. The record is clear, and I have stated it so many times but repeat it today, that the Government knew of the South Vietnam ships that had left the South Vietnam ports to go into Tonkin Bay to attack North Vietnamese islands a few short miles from the coast of North Vietnam.

The record is also clear that American destroyers were in radio communication with Saigon.

The record is further clear that the bombing of the North Vietnamese islands amounted to an attack on North Vietnam, because those islands are a part of the territory of North Vietnam. Our destroyers were standing within a short distance of the area where the bombing was taking place—on the high seas, it is true, and under international law at a place where they had a right to be; nevertheless, they were there, available to give cover, if cover became necessary.

As I said at the time, when I protested the conduct of the United States as a provocateur nation in respect to the attacks on the island of North Vietnam, when it was misrepresented to the American people, as the Pentagon constantly misrepresents to the American people in its propaganda in regard to this war, that the ships were supposed to be 75 miles from the mainland of North Vietnam. Of course it was not true. We finally produced the evidence which showed that the Pentagon propaganda was false. But the record will show that I pointed out at the time: Suppose Castro decided to bomb Key West, Fla., with a Cuban torpedo boat, and a Russian destroyer was 75 miles away, what do we think the United States would do? It would give the torpedo boat one chance to come into port under the escort of the American Navy, or we would sink it. Apparently, the Pentagon believes that these policies should work only one way.

Mr. President, the log of the ship itself showed that it was somewhere around 13 miles from the coast. Under international law we had the right to respond immediately in national self-defense to the attack of those torpedo boats upon our destroyers. We did. The President of the United States was completely within his rights under international law.

It will be remembered that there was a second incident of another attack, and we had a perfect right to respond in self-defense against the attacking vessels; but we had no right under international law to go beyond attacking those vessels and the mainland of North Vietnam. When we did, the United States, under international law, became an aggressor, and has been so branded by many an alleged allied spokesman

around the world. We had the right to act in self-defense in response to the torpedo boat attack against our own torpedo boats. Then we had at least an international obligation to lay our charge against North Vietnam before the United Nations immediately for threatening the peace by attacking American boats on the high seas.

The sad and ugly reality is that the United States, too, has been an aggressor from the very beginning in the war in Asia. The sad and ugly reality is that the United States, too, along with the despicable Communists, violated the Geneva accords from the very beginning.

The administration would like to cover up the illegality of its own acts. It published a white paper, but not one word did it tell the American people regarding the violation of international law by the United States. Not one word was in that propaganda sheet, which was aimed at deceiving American public opinion, to indicate that the International Control Commission found not only North Vietnam and the Vietcong in violation of the Geneva accords, but also found the United States and South Vietnam in violation of the Geneva accords time and time again.

I say to the American people again: "You are not being given the facts about American policies and actions in southeast Asia, and you have not been given the facts from the very beginning."

It is about time for us to come within the framework of international law and lay our case involving the threat to the peace of the world in Asia by the Communists before the United Nations for adjudication.

Mr. President, I cannot stress too emphatically my very deep conviction that if the United States continues to send over the thousands and thousands of men that the Secretary of Defense is talking about—if we continue this escalation, we shall find ourselves in a massive war in Asia that will last for years.

Now is the time, before it is too late, to seek to avoid the shocking bloodshed by Americans and Asians that would flow from that war.

We should seek under existing international procedures, an honorable solution of the war because if there is any world left to negotiate, before we are led into a nuclear war, the conflict will finally be settled on about the same terms upon which it would be settled now if the United Nations took jurisdiction.

Are we never going to learn as the result of history? Are we never going to read the sordid details of the results of war?

Mr. President, we are now in an era in which we cannot on any moral grounds justify seeking to win a peace through war.

What is the alibi given by our Government for the accelerated escalation, for every action we have taken?

We say we have taken it for retaliation. But every action the Vietcong and North Vietnamese have taken they have called retaliation.

I do not know why so many are so surprised that after our bombing of

North Vietnam, the North Vietnamese stepped up their military support to the Vietcong. Is it right only if it works one way? Is it justifiable if only the United States escalates, but it is wrong if North Vietnam seeks to help the Vietnamese? At least they are helping their own skin brothers.

Do not forget that not so many years ago there were no North Vietnamese and South Vietnamese. They were all Vietnamese.

And do not forget that the Geneva accords do not provide for two governments in Vietnam. The United States, not the Geneva accords, created two governments in Vietnam.

The Geneva accords did not provide for the setting up of a U.S. puppet government under the shocking dictator we sent over there when he was in exile in Washington, D.C., and New York City. We financed him, militarized him, and put him in power to rule with the police dictatorship over the Vietnamese; and we were surprised that he was not received with open arms.

Thus, we have supported one American police puppet after another in South Vietnam, and our Government has the audacity to talk about being over there to support freedom. There has not been an hour of freedom under American rule in South Vietnam.

Under American rule the United States has supported military tyrannies—police states denying civil liberties. A police state, be it a Communist police state or an American financed military police state, immoral and unjustifiable.

So North Vietnam and the Vietcong have also retaliated and escalated.

That is all war is, really, to meet an enemy and best him in military combat until he is reduced to peace on the terms of the winner. The point at which a war can be said to be "won" is the point where the side with the preponderant strength is willing to accept terms offered by the weaker side. North Vietnam, too, has its conditions under which it says it will negotiate. Those terms are as unacceptable to us as ours are to the north. So each party in turn raises the level of the war, trying to gain the advantage.

In the way in which we are advancing into the war and the way in which we describe its supposed objectives make it little different from any other war. Both sides, we no less than North Vietnam, are stepping up their military activities in an effort to best the other, and they, no less than we, are quite willing to have the issues settled by negotiation just as soon as the United States is willing to accept the terms of settlement offered by North Vietnam.

That is why the parties litigant, so to speak—the war participants—are not the ones that can lead the world to the conference table. That is why noncombatants, representatives of the United Nations that have exactly the same international law obligations as the United States under that treaty, have the clear duty to call for the conference for which the senior Senator from Oregon has been pleading, and without which, in my judgment, the world is headed for a holocaust.

PRESENT POLICY IN ASIA FORFEITS OUR NATIONAL HONOR

The shameful and sickening manner in which the United States has engaged itself in this war without so much as a glance in the direction of its legal obligations under the United Nations Charter is going to be marked down to the everlasting discredit of the United States. We are doing what we have for years exhorted other nations not to do—settling our international differences by resort to force of arms.

We are doing what we have for years condemned Red China for doing—using force against other countries in disregard of the United Nations Charter. We have called Red China an outlaw nation for her flagrant violations of the U.N. Charter, but her violations differ only in form and not substance from our own.

The President spoke Tuesday of our national honor and our national word. I ask him, What about our word as put down by our signature on the U.N. Charter?

What about our honor as a nation that seeks the moral leadership of the world as the exponent of the rule of law rather than the rule of the claw in world affairs?

It may be enough to appeal to our own people on the basis of a mutual pledge that has not been kept by the other side; namely, South Vietnam. But the rest of the world knows that we are behaving in southeast Asia in exactly the same way we have condemned so many others for behaving. That is why so many of our professed friends and erstwhile allies have left us in the lurch in Vietnam. That is why all the lists of countries helping in South Vietnam lists noncombatant elements numbering in the dozens, and combat soldiers only from the other two white countries in the area—Australia and New Zealand, plus South Korea.

Where are all our treaty partners from SEATO? Where are the Philippines, and Pakistan, and Thailand? More important, where are India and Japan, the two great non-Communist powers of Asia?

Certainly they are not joining us, and there is no reason to think their people are even for us. They are openly critical of the United States.

Earlier I said that if we had a declaration of war, in my judgment we would have a split body politic in the United States over the advisability of such declaration. When I said I thought there were reasons why this administration is so hesitant about formally declaring war, I did not mention another, so I mention it now. If we do declare war against another country, we shall automatically change the legal status of every other country in the world. A nation's relationship with noncombatants becomes entirely different in a myriad of respects under international law when it becomes a belligerent.

That means that the course of action the President may take in connection with escalation may affect the sovereign rights of noncombatants. That is why I have been heard to say on occasion on

the floor of the Senate, in regard to Britain, that it may very well be that the Wilson regime will tumble and topple in Great Britain because of United States policies in Vietnam and the failure on the part of the Prime Minister of Great Britain to follow a course of action that will maintain for him a majority of support in Britain.

We hear much talk by Members of the House, telling the American people that North Vietnam ought to be blockaded by the American Navy, supported by American Air Forces. What do they suppose the Union Jack will do? Let those warmongers and warhawks who want to involve the American people in a major war in Asia, shockingly proposing the bombing of Hanoi and the Chinese nuclear bases, tell the American people what assurance they have that the British Jack will ever be lowered to an American blockade. If it is, it will be the first time in the history of the British Empire. Throughout the decades the British Government has made clear to the nations of the world that the British flag will never be lowered to a blockade that the British Government is not willing to accept.

Does anyone believe that the French flag will be lowered to an American blockade in Asia, when De Gaulle is openly in opposition to American policy in Asia? I could continue to cite one problem after another in regard to the international law relations that a declaration of war would create. Because of that, I have formed my suspicions that one of the reasons why the President does not want to make the war in southeast Asia a legal war under the Constitution is that a formal declaration of war would create problems between the United States and our allies, or alleged allies, around the world, that would soon find us with fewer friends than we now have.

The answer is not war. The answer to the threat to the peace in Asia is not the killing of Americans and Vietnamese in increasing numbers. The answer is to substitute the rule of reason for the jungle law of military might. Oh, what a great opportunity our country has to advance the cause of permanent peace by stopping warmaking and calling upon all nations that are willing to help to police a peacekeeping program in southeast Asia to join, under the jurisdiction of the United Nations, to effectuate such a cause.

I say to the President that his policy of further escalating the American war in South Vietnam will result in escalation by the other side. He will be announcing many more escalations if he does not first announce a complete change in policy.

The President's statement on Tuesday is an admission that the United States in no way controls the war. We do not control our participation in it because we do not control the other nations on the other side who have an interest in it. All we are doing is trying to make it too costly for them to continue. But we have given no thought as yet to whether they might have the same policy in mind.

BASIS FOR U.S. ACTIONS HAS BEEN CHANGED SINCE
LAST FALL

The President is in the process of making the Vietnam war into an all-American war. This is quite a change in the viewpoint of the President since August 1964, because in August 1964, he said, in Texas:

I have had advice to load our planes with bombs and to drop them on certain areas that I think would enlarge the war and escalate the war, and result in our committing a good many American boys to fighting a war that I think ought to be fought by the boys of Asia to help protect their own land. And for that reason, I haven't chosen to enlarge the war.

Obviously, the President has changed his mind. But he has not told us why. He has not told us why it is no longer American policy to avoid committing American boys to do the fighting that Asians should be doing for themselves. Is it because they are not sufficiently interested? I am not talking now about South Vietnam only. I am talking about the countries of all of Asia, who appear to be more frightened by what America is doing than by the prospect of what might happen if we ceased our war activity in their part of the world.

In New York, on August 12, 1964, the President said:

Some others are eager to enlarge the conflict. They call upon us to supply American boys to do the job that Asian boys should do. They ask us to take reckless action which might risk the lives of millions and engulf much of Asia and certainly threaten the peace of the entire world. Moreover, such action would offer no solution at all to the real problems of Vietnam.

Oh, Mr. President, on August 12, 1964, you were so right. Such action offers no solution at all to the problems of Vietnam. Yet you are now taking Americans down the road of escalating the war and supplying American boys to do the job that Asian boys should do, if that is what Asians want done.

On September 28, 1964, in Manchester, N.H., the President said:

So just for a moment I have not thought that we were ready for American boys to do the fighting for Asian boys. What I have been trying to do, with the situation that I found, was to get the boys in Vietnam to do their own fighting with our advice and with our equipment. That is the course we are following. So we are not going north and drop bombs at this stage of the game, and we are not going south and run out and leave it for the Communists to take over. We have lost 190 American lives, and to each one of those 190 families this is a major war. We lost that many in Texas on the Fourth of July in wrecks. But I often wake up in the night and think about how many I could lose if I made a misstep. When we retaliated in the Tonkin Gulf, we dropped bombs on their nests where they had their PT boats housed, and we dropped them within 35 miles of the Chinese border. I don't know what you would think if they started dropping them 35 miles from your border, but I think that that is something you have to take into consideration.

So we are not going north and we are not going south; we are going to continue to try to get them to save their own freedom with their own men, with our leadership and our officer direction, and such equipment as we can furnish them. We think that losing 190 lives in the period that we have been out

there is bad, but it is not like 190,000 that we might lose the first month if we escalate that war. So we are trying somehow to evolve a way, as we have in some other places, where the North Vietnamese and the Chinese Communists finally, after getting worn down, conclude that they will leave their neighbors alone, and if they do we will come home tomorrow.

In these speeches, the President repudiated the idea of escalating the war, and of putting American combat troops into Vietnam. Many voters relied on those statements. In that campaign the President took the fight to Goldwater on this very issue. He led the American people to believe that if he were elected President, the policy in Asia would be different from the warmaking policy that Goldwater was recommending. I say, in all respect, that Goldwater could not possibly have moved further and faster than the President has moved in leading us into a war in Asia.

The President has a right to change his mind. However, he has a duty to present to the American people his justification for changing his mind, and sound reasons for changing his mind.

In my judgment the President has miserably failed in justifying his warmaking in Asia. One thing that has changed since last August has been the increasing failure of the Government of South Vietnam to establish itself as a governing institution. So the sound and wise and justified theory that Americans should not fight Asians' war for them has somehow been shoved completely out of the picture.

One does not hear anything from the administration now about the size of the South Vietnamese Military Establishment. I say to the American taxpayers that they have thrown \$6.5 billion into the South Vietnamese Military Establishment, counting the billion and a quarter that we poured into the French endeavor when we were trying to keep the French in that war.

On the basis of testimony from those in the Pentagon, it was stated over and over again before the Committee on Foreign Relations, on which I serve, that we are dealing with an equipped South Vietnamese Military Establishment of at least 500,000, nearer 750,000. The Vietcong are poorly equipped in comparison with the South Vietnamese Military Establishment and without any air support at all. There are probably in the neighborhood of 50,000 to 75,000 hard core Vietcong.

There is a South Vietnamese population in the neighborhood of 15 million. The interesting thing is that the Vietcong control about 75 percent of the land area of Vietnam. What the American people are not being told is that they control the local government, they collect the taxes, they appoint the teachers. They are the body politic of about 75 percent of the land area of South Vietnam.

This administration will not give us the facts about what goes on in the Vietcong controlled areas of South Vietnam.

Does anyone mean to tell me that, with a military establishment of some 500,000 up to 750,000 South Vietnamese soldiery,

with the best equipment that can be supplied by the U.S. Government, with the air force equipment with which we have supplied them, with the naval power of the U.S. fleet in the waters adjoining that area, and with a population approaching 15 million, we must send thousands and thousands of American boys over there to do the fighting for them?

Mr. President, if the South Vietnamese with the kind of support that they have received from the United States cannot settle this war they ought to be told to proceed to negotiate a settlement of that war at an honorable peace table under the jurisdiction of noncombatants through the procedures of the United Nations. That is my answer. It will continue to be my answer until a successful rebuttal comes from either the White House or the State Department. As of today, they have been unable to produce any rebuttal under international law that would destroy the logic of my arguments, including the arguments that I have presented in the memorandums requested by the President of the United States for the consideration of both the State Department and our representatives in the United Nations.

The sad fact is that we are derelict in our clear obligations under the United Nations Charter. We are grossly derelict in respect to our moral obligations.

There is no satisfactory explanation forthcoming from this administration. There has been no explanation as to why the old theory was discarded and no explanation of what new theory we may be working on in Asia, if any.

WE NO LONGER FIGHT FOR THE FREEDOM OF
SOUTH VIETNAM

In light of the repudiation of our past rationalizations for our activities in Vietnam, we must now assume that only direct American interests are motivating our new war effort. We are running the show. We are running the war. The responsibility and the interests at stake have become ours.

If there were any concern left in official circles for the fate of the people of South Vietnam, who have become mere pawns in this struggle between United States and communism, we never would have permitted a rotted mind like that of General Ky to become associated with and fostered by the American Government.

Who is General Ky? He is the latest corrupt tyrant being supported by the United States in a dictatorial position in South Vietnam. We have had a chain of them, one after another. He is the latest. Let us take a look at him, Mr. President. We would never receive this information from the white paper released by the Pentagon. We would never get this information out of any paper released by this administration. This kind of information we must go abroad to get, for it must be concealed from the American people.

Mr. President, there are still a few people left in this country—I do not know how much longer they will be allowed to speak—who are willing to tell the American people the truth as they find the

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truth in connection with U.S. outlawry in southeast Asia.

Who is this tyrant whom we are supporting, called General Ky? General Ky has only one hero—Adolf Hitler. So he tells us in the interview published July 6 by the Sunday Mirror of London:

People ask me who my heroes are. I have only one—Hitler. I admire Hitler because he pulled his country together when it was in a terrible state in the early thirties. But the situation here is so desperate now that one man would not be enough. We need four or five Hitlers in Vietnam.

That ought to be the end of American support for General Ky.

One is tempted to remind General Ky that Franklin Roosevelt also pulled a much bigger country together in the early thirties when it was in a terrible state, but it is obvious that Ky is attracted far more to the attributes of a Hitler than to the attributes of a Franklin Roosevelt.

The hand of violence fits General Ky just as it fits the Communists who always find it easier to shoot, murder, and enslave those who make themselves inconvenient or who do not fit in with the plans of the ruler. Inspiration, statesmanship, leadership of all the people in a common cause—these are attributes that are foreign to Ky just as they were to Hitler.

This tyrant Ky, supported by the U.S. Government, is a remarkable prototype of Hitler, in charge of the police state we help maintain in South Vietnam; and out of the other side of our leadership's mouth they prate about supporting freedom in South Vietnam. They have millions of American people convinced that we are supporting freedom in South Vietnam, when what we are supporting is military tyranny and dictatorship.

Hitler rallied a majority by turning their fears and hatreds upon a minority within their midst, and by so doing he created a record of human bestiality that the world has been trying to forget for 20 years.

Yet that is the kind of leadership that this man is offering to the people of South Vietnam, with American backing, American financing, and with the lifeblood of American soldiers.

What a shame. What a shame, Mr. President.

I ask unanimous consent that the entire text of the interview from the Sunday Mirror be printed at the conclusion of my remarks.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.

(See exhibit 1.)

Mr. MORSE. I point out also that Ky shares another opinion of Hitler's, and that is that territory lost by treaty can be retaken by force of arms. The story about General Ky points out that he was "widely thought to have been responsible for Khanh's boast that the Vietnamese air force has the capability of dropping bombs on military targets in North Vietnam and South China"—boasts made before the bombing of the north actually began. One can only wonder whether General Ky has plans for China, too, to

be carried out with the help of the Americans.

Press stories coming from Saigon today make one even more suspicious as to what this tyrant is up to. He is now saying to the American military over there, and to the American representatives sent over there, including the Secretary of Defense, "America must now fight a war in Vietnam to win"—and he leaves no doubt as to his views and that what is necessary to win is to proceed to take the war to China.

U.S. INTEREST AIMS AT CHINA, NOT VIETNAM

Perhaps this administration can whip up a war hysteria in this country sufficient to get the people in a hysterical state to support our going to war against China by way of our escalating the war into China.

I have said for many months that I am satisfied, as a member of the Foreign Relations Committee of the U.S. Senate, that we have a dangerous, desperate group of men in the Pentagon who want a preventive war against China and who would like to create an opportunity to bomb the Chinese nuclear installations. I consider them the most desperate and dangerous men in all the world. The shocking and despicable Communist leaders of Russia and China have thus far—who knows how much longer?—given evidence that they wish to avoid that massive war.

I cannot understand how anyone could even for a moment believe that if the United States should bomb nuclear installations of Red China, Red Russia could stay out of the war and maintain any position of leadership in the Communist segment of the war.

A week ago yesterday, I went as far as I could under the doctrine of privilege in disclosing the basis for a judgment of mine, which I had reported to the President of the United States and to the Secretary of State, which causes me to believe that if the United States bombs either Hanoi or China, Red Russia will come into the war.

As I said a week ago Thursday, it is my opinion that that war would not be limited to China. I said then, and repeat today, Russia will not let the United States pick the battlefield. She will pick her own battlefield, and I happen to think it will be New York City, Washington, D.C., Detroit, Seattle, San Francisco, and other great population centers of the United States.

However, if she comes into the war, she knows she will have to come into an all-out nuclear war. The ungodly implication is that no one will win, but all will be destroyed. I say to my God on the floor of the Senate this afternoon, How can we justify our warmaking cause of action with all of these dangers pregnant and inherent?

I am at a complete loss to understand it. Those of us who are willing must continue to protest, must continue to plead, must continue to challenge, in the hope that the rays of reason will finally break through the war clouds and the sunshine of a peaceful day will break upon the world.

We know, too, that General Ky has often expressed the view that the war must be carried north on the ground as well as in the air. At least Hitler envisioned regaining his lost territory through the efforts of his own people, and not on the backs of American soldiers.

But General Ky should read history past the thirties. He will find out that after regaining the lost lands and conquering most of Europe, Hitler left Germany only half the country it was before he started. His legacy to his people was the occupation of a huge chunk of German territory by the Communist, and occupation which, after 20 years, shows no signs of being terminated.

Russia is in there as the keeper of the puppet regime of East Germany, just as the United States is the keeper of the puppet regime of South Vietnam.

When we reach the council tables of the world, let me warn the American people that we are not going to be exonerated, we are not going to be found with clean hands, but with hands dripping with blood.

All we can hope and pray for is that our hands will be washed in the solution of a peaceful negotiation which will do honor to all the world, including the combatants in this unholy war.

As stupid as Ky is, the fact remains that he is our man. He is our protege. He flies our planes. He wears our clothes. He spends our money. He is all Government-issue, so far as we are concerned. He is the creature of the 10-year U.S. military aid program in South Vietnam. His only hero, he says, is Adolf Hitler.

Unless we change our policy in Vietnam, we are going to wind up with much the same disaster on our hands in Vietnam that engulfed Germany. Communism has made all its gains out of war. A general war in Asia will extend its dominion even further.

With each step this country has taken alone, unaccompanied, and unilaterally down the road to war, the chances of limiting the war and limiting communism have become dimmer and dimmer.

Perhaps the last chance for peace lies with the nonparties to the war who can yet bring the Vietnam war under the jurisdiction of the United Nations.

Mr. President, I have been pleading with my Government to assume its obligation by taking the issue to the United Nations, calling for an extraordinary session and announcing that we would lay the threat to the peace of the world before the procedures of the United Nations for its jurisdiction and its adjudication, with our pledge of cooperation to implement the decisions reached.

We either believe in a government of law in the settlement of a threat to the peace of the world, or we believe in taking mankind down the road to what I fear will be a great disaster through war.

CONGRESS MUST REMAIN IN SESSION

Most certainly the only possible domestic restraint upon the executive branch—the Congress—must remain in session this fall.

I warn the American people that the drive is going to be on to adjourn Congress. The drive is going to be on to send Congress home. With Congress out of session, it will be easier for the warmakers to proceed with fewer checks being made upon their warmaking.

So far as I am concerned, so long as American boys are dying in southeast Asia, it is my position that Congress should never go out of session, because under the separation of powers doctrine of the Constitution under which we function, Congress owes it to the American people to remain in session and maintain a constant check upon the executive branch of the Government.

There are many reasons why we should remain in session at some length this year, but the compelling and controlling reason is that we cannot justify giving the administration a free hand in conducting the war with Congress in adjournment.

The floor of the House of Representatives and the floor of the Senate must be kept available for whatever public consideration is necessary to maintain a constant and vigilant check upon the administration in connection with the conduct of this war.

It is true that our constitutional function to check the President in his conduct of foreign affairs as well as in domestic affairs has atrophied to the point of disappearing. I have been speaking about this trend toward government by executive supremacy for nigh on 15 out of the 20 years I have served in the Senate. For the past 15 years, I have been trying to warn the American people with specific proof after specific proof of the tendency of Congress to delegate away more and more of its checking responsibilities under the Constitution, leaving the American people with a government by executive supremacy. I have warned many times, and will continue to warn the American people, that they cannot cite a single government in the history of mankind which remained free, while the people were subjected to a government by executive supremacy.

Freedom for the individual is incompatible with government by executive supremacy, which is but a polite word for dictatorship of one degree, form, or another.

Let me say to the voters of this country that they have the responsibility to hold their elected officials to a political accounting. They have the duty of citizen-statesmanship to check up and see to what extent their elected officials are delegating away to the executive branch of the Government the residual controls and checking obligations which the Constitution vests in Congress.

I am talking about the principle of government, which many find to be a dry subject. It is difficult to see the direct application of an abstract principle of government to their precious, concrete freedoms and liberties.

The answer is that there are no freedoms or liberties except in relationship to the abstract principles of government which we call constitutional guarantees.

We have delegated so many congressional powers over war and over the

armed services to the President that we are now merely bystanders to the exercise of these legislative powers not only by the President but by the Secretary of Defense.

The result has been the virtual abdication of our checking power. The administration has been quick to take advantage of the situation by keeping away from Congress any real opportunity to decide the use of American military forces in Asia. Any President always prefers to gather to himself as close to an exclusive decisionmaking power as he can manage to gather. Given a Congress anxious to cooperate, and the constitutional framework which was created to prevent a President from plunging the Nation into foreign adventures on his own decision is effectively destroyed.

But so long as Congress sits, we continue to hold the power to assert our duties. So long as we remain in session, the President knows that at least we are able to exercise our constitutional function if we choose to do so.

In his press conference on Wednesday, the Secretary of Defense made it clear that the administration was about to exercise another congressional power that has been delegated to it—that of calling up reservists and national guardsmen. Thus, another escalation of the war effort is about to take place without the slightest reference to Congress. The Members of Congress who insist they have voted for Vietnam resolutions only to endorse past acts and not to give a blank check for future acts are getting their answer now.

As the senior Senator from Oregon warned them, they are getting their answer now. They sought to justify their vote of confidence in the President's policy by saying they were not giving him a blank check. They gave him a blank check, and he is using it.

They have the power to take it away. I say to the American people: "You really have that answer. You made it clear to Members of Congress that you want them to take away the blanket authority, the blank-check authority that they have tried to delegate to the President of the United States. You can deliver that message in a manner that they will understand."

I believe it is the only way that we shall be able to stop this escalation.

I suggest that Congress keep in mind that even as the land forces are increased in Vietnam, the air raids in the north are moving ever closer to China. I doubt there is any coincidence in the two events. When we have landed a sufficient land army in Vietnam and prepared adequate coastal bases to supply it, the air raids will find their way to areas in or around China that will bring China into the war.

Mr. President, it saddens me to say it, but, in carrying out my trust in the Senate, I must warn the American people about what I think the preventive war crowd in the Pentagon has in mind.

We have read in the newspapers during the past 72 hours that the U.S. Air Force has bombed a segment of the China railroad in North Vietnam. The bombing took place only a few miles from the

China border. This is an interesting location of this segment of the railroad. The railroad comes out of Red China, crosses the border to North Vietnam, where there is a projection of territory, makes a loop through North Vietnamese territory, and goes back into Red China.

The U.S. Air Force bombed the part of the railroad that is in that North Vietnamese loop. If that is not provocation, Mr. President, I wish someone would define the word for me.

It is the fear of the senior Senator from Oregon that the Pentagon, in its escalating war policies, will continue deliberately, willfully, intentionally, and knowingly to follow a course of action aimed at provoking Red China to commit an overt act.

I am satisfied that if Red China commits an overt act, she will be quickly bombed. That is the risk. That is the great danger that confronts humanity. That is the threat leading to the beginning of a nuclear war.

As I said a few moments ago, a bombing of Hanoi will leave her no choice. It is not possible to bomb Hanoi without killing Russians.

Let the American people understand that Red Russia is now giving military support to North Vietnam to the degree that there are a considerable number of Russians in Hanoi—technicians and military advisers necessary to advise them in the use of the military equipment that Red Russia has sent to them.

Does anyone believe that the United States can bomb Hanoi and start killing Russians, and that the Kremlin will send us a thank you note? They will send us a declaration of war, or they will make war, declaration or not.

Whatever the views of the President in this respect, I am satisfied that the chance to bomb China is the objective of a large body of opinion in the Pentagon and unfortunately the Department of State. One need only review the history of our public pronouncements on the war over the last 3 years to appreciate that we have moved steadily away from justifying our acts as an assistance to South Vietnam, and closer and closer to justifying our acts as the only means of containing China. The ultimate "containment" is the nuclear bombing of China's major industries, including her nuclear installations.

Mr. President, let me repeat for the benefit of the American people: "I tell you that the Pentagon recognizes that it cannot defeat Red China with bombing, nuclear or conventional; and the warhawks in the House, who have been trying to egg the administration onto the bombing of Hanoi and even a bombing of Red China, would have the American people believe that we can win the war with bombings, either nuclear or conventional. It cannot be done, and the military know it and say so—in private."

I know that I am getting pretty close, but I am still within the rules. The American people are entitled to have everything the senior Senator from Oregon can tell them within the rules. I challenge the Pentagon to issue a statement denying what I have just said. I warn them that if they put out a propa-

ganda statement denying it, all the rules of privileges before the Committee on Foreign Relations will be out the window so far as the senior Senator from Oregon is concerned.

I would rather take the discipline of the Senate than deny to the American people what those briefings will show, if the Pentagon denies what the senior Senator from Oregon has said, that they admit they cannot beat Red China with bombing, nuclear or conventional.

They will have to beat her in both the air and on the ground. If they take on Red China on the ground, they will have to send hundreds of thousands of American boys to China, to die in a war which in my judgment cannot be justified on any grounds.

The American people must come to grips with the ugly crisis that faces us. The American people must stop passing the buck to their Government. The American people must recognize the fact that it is their ultimate responsibility to decree what the American foreign policy shall be, and that it is not the responsibility of the President of the United States, for under our constitutional system he is but the administrator of a people's foreign policy.

The American people die. American soldiers die by the thousands and thousands and thousands.

I shall at least go to my grave knowing that I tried to warn the American people, before it was too late, of the inevitable consequences of a continuation of the Johnson administration's policy of supporting what started out to be McNamara's war in Asia.

And when we are adequately prepared on the ground, we will be ready to start whatever provocative bombing around her southern borders may be necessary.

The Congress here at home, and the members of the United Nations abroad, apparently are the only agencies left that can alter the course of this war, except my President and yours.

Mr. President, let me put at rest once again the charge or criticism that is made against the senior Senator from Oregon that by taking the position he takes in opposition to his Government's war in Asia, he is aiding and abetting communism.

I yield to no one in this country in my hatred of everything that the ideology of communism stands for, but I am satisfied that those who are escalating the war in Asia are the greatest allies the Communists have in the world.

American foreign policy in Asia is misunderstood by the hundreds of thousands in the underdeveloped areas of the world.

Those are the areas in which we ought to win the fight for men's minds over to the cause of freedom, but we can never win them by making war.

Also, do not forget, Mr. President, that we are white men, by and large. Americans are looked upon in Asia as white men, and Asians are determined to see to it that Asia is not dominated by any white nation, in whole or in part.

That is why what we are buying for ourselves is a war that will return to us many military victories.

As I have heard leading advisers in the Pentagon say: "We can kill them by the millions with our bombing; we can destroy their cities; we can knock out their nuclear bases; but to beat them we have to meet them on the ground."

We can do all that, Mr. President, but we will leave the United States bogged down in Asia for 25 to 50 years.

We have neither the manpower nor the economic power ultimately to win that war in the sense that people mean it when they talk about victory.

So, Mr. President, as the last point of my speech—and I shall be very brief on it, I say to my friend from West Virginia, I set forth the conclusion I have reached most reluctantly.

I have come to the conclusion that now is the time for the United States to go on to an economic war basis.

I wish to say to my administration: "If you are going to win the war in Asia, you cannot justify a single dollar profit for a single American businessman in this whole country."

If we are going to fight this war, let us do what we can to see to it that there is spread across this Republic an equality of sacrifice, to the extent there can be such equality—and, of course, the word defines itself when we speak about equality in terms of supreme sacrifice, and equality in support of making profits out of blood.

If we are going to fight this war, now is the time to go on a war footing. Now is the time to bring into existence price and wage stabilization procedures and bodies. Now is the time to take the profit out of war.

The other day a representative of a great union sat in my office protesting my position on the war in Vietnam. I listened patiently, very much interested in a point of view that is held by too many labor leaders in the United States today.

During the conversation, he mentioned the great interest his union had in the helicopters, airplanes, munitions, and war materiel in Vietnam that was being manufactured by their labor. Senators know that I would be aghast. I was shocked to think that even the thought should go through his mind that any change in my position should be dictated by the alleged benefits to the economy of the United States by fighting a war in South Vietnam.

But, as politely as I could, I made it very clear to that labor leader that the senior Senator from Oregon was not going to vote to pay for jobs for American workmen in war plants with the blood of American boys in Vietnam.

Mr. President, we shall continue to escalate this war.

If the McNamara program is for calling up the Reserves, if the McNamara program is for calling up the National Guard, if the McNamara program is for increasing the manpower—the present figure is 170,000—let me say to the American people: Get ready. One hundred seventy thousand will be the minimum. We shall go far beyond that figure; and if China comes in, we shall have them over by the hundreds of thousands.

Now is the time to put the economy of this country on a war basis.

If we get into a full-scale war, the constant emergency changes that will be required to prosecute it will be so sweeping and drastic for the duration of that total war that we will not know this Government. Now is the time, in the interests of preserving this system of government, to go on a war footing economically. This is no time for the American people to be making money out of blood. On the contrary, if the policy is to be a war policy, let us make it a war policy for everyone, not only for the boys who do the fighting and dying.

Oh, I can read the editorials now. I can read the criticisms now of the position that the Senator from Oregon is taking. But I stand on it. When we start talking about having 170,000 boys in South Vietnam, when we start talking about the expenditure of funds the administration is talking about for Vietnam, we have a duty to make every citizen—I do not care what his economic status is—enlist in the ranks for the war effort.

The senior Senator from Oregon will continue to insist, in speech after speech, as the administration continues to escalate the war, that checks be placed on all segments of the American economy, not only business, but labor, as well, to require them to make their sacrifices for the prosecution of that war. I do not ever want to hear mentioned to me again that this war is good for the economy of the country. I am not interested in blood money.

I shall yield in a moment to the Senator from West Virginia, prior to beginning the second speech I shall make today, a speech I was prevented from making last night because of the parliamentary situation.

I am saddened that I feel it necessary to make this speech. It is not an easy speech to make. It does not make one happy to disagree with the President of the United States, for whom he has affection. I have done so and shall continue to do so because I believe the best service I can render my President is to disagree with him when I believe he is wrong. I believe that my President has been ill advised, and I shall continue to pray that in some way, somehow, an understanding may come to permeate this administration, that will cause our policymakers to turn back out of the jungle, go back to the fork in the road, and march again to the goal of peace that really will blaze in the sunlight, if only we will take the right road.

EXHIBIT 1

[From the New York Mirror, July 4, 1965]
OUR ALLY: A PREMIER WHOSE HERO IS HITLER

(By Brian Moynahan)

"I admire Hitler because he pulled his country together," says South Vietnam's latest leader.

"People ask me who my heroes are. I have only one—Hitler." These are the words of Air Vice Marshal Nguyen Cao Ky, latest Prime Minister of South Vietnam, whose remote, unstable country has the whole world holding its breath. The comment of this flamboyant little dictator, who grasped office by a military coup while 70,000 American soldiers strove to keep the Communists at bay, highlights the whole tragedy of the thankless Vietnam war. Ky outlined his

philosophy on Adolf Hitler in this remarkable interview sometime before the takeover.

Ky said: "I admire Hitler because he pulled his country together when it was in a terrible state in the early thirties.

"But the situation here is so desperate now that one man would not be enough. We need four or five Hitlers in Vietnam."

We met in his huge office at Tan Son Nhut air base on the outskirts of Saigon, when Ky commanded the Vietnamese air force.

Now, as the country's 10th Premier in 20 months, he and his fragile government face a situation more desperate than ever.

Outspoken and colorful, Ky looks every inch a pilot. He is small and lightly built. He wears an impressive mustache—surprisingly thick for an oriental.

COLOR

On flying missions, he sports twin, pearl-handled revolvers and purple chokers.

Even his private plane—a twin-engined Aero Commander, which he pilots on tours of the countryside—is purple. "It's my favorite color, because it is my girl friend's favorite color," he explained.

His girl friend, a slender and beautiful half-Chinese Vietnamese, who was an Air Vietnam hostess, is now his wife.

The big office reflected his character. It was splashed with bright blue flags and curtains. Orange and silver flying helmets hung from the walls.

Beatles' music—"Yes. I like them," he said with a smile—poured from a hi-fi set in the corner.

The man the Western nations now find themselves supporting in the name of freedom had a loaded .45 revolver as a paperweight on his desk.

The desk was stacked with thrillers and French paperbacks.

An automatic rifle, with the catch at "fire," was handy on the wall * * * "just in case the Vietcong try to catch me here instead of in the air."

The Vietcong have, indeed, had plenty of chances. Before he became Premier last month, Ky flew his American Skyraider fighter-bomber on at least one mission a week. His plane was hit several times and he was nicked by fragments when leading a recent raid on North Vietnam. But he is a superb pilot, trained in France, Algeria and America.

"One of the best," an American told me, "very brave, but not death-or-glory reckless."

On off-duty weekends, Ky would go up to Dalat, a mist-shrouded officers' retreat in the mountains northeast of Saigon, where the luxurious villas change with every political shift in the capital. He likes to hunt from the backs of elephants.

The tough political line he is taking now—he has clamped a curfew on Saigon's wild nightlife, publicly executed a terrorist and threatened the same punishment to profiteers—is not surprising.

TOUGH

When another terrorist was executed in Saigon last October, Ky told me: "I want an air force firing squad to do it and I want to be the officer in charge.

"We have to be tough. As tough as the Vietcong.

"We are losing the countryside because the government here is weak and not trusted. The towns are getting rotten and corrupt.

"We must have, soon, a strong leader whom the people out in the villages can admire and trust and who can control the towns."

He was then leader of the officers who saved General Khanh's government from an attempted coup last September—and who exacted growing concessions and influence in return.

PURGE

Ky was widely thought to have been responsible for Khanh's boast that the Viet-

namese air force had "the capability of dropping bombs on military targets in North Vietnam and South China"—a move that could have escalated the war disastrously for the rest of the world.

His policy then was to "put all the country's effort into the war by purging the Army of incompetent officers, stopping wild rumors and defeatism and taking a firm hand with demonstrations."

Next, he would start to win the country back from the guerillas, village by village.

Whether Ky can live up to his hopes and prove strong and mature enough for his crushing responsibilities remains to be seen.

South Vietnam's "strong man" premiers—Diem, Big Minh, Khanh—have come and gone in quickening succession.

Even Ky himself smiled when I asked him if he was interested in the Premiership: "Here, that can only be a short-term ambition."

EXHIBIT 2

[From the Wall Street Journal, July 15, 1965]

GLOOM IN VIETNAM: DOUBTS RISE THAT THE UNITED STATES CAN MOVE FAST ENOUGH TO BLUNT REDS' DRIVE—AMERICAN STRENGTH INCREASES, BUT COMMUNISTS CONTINUE TO GOBBLE UP TERRITORY—A HOLLOW VICTORY AT DAC TO

(By Philip Geyelin)

TAN CANH, SOUTH VIETNAM.—Are we too late in South Vietnam?

That thought haunts more than one American war planner here, even as fresh forces pile onto coastal beachheads and the military pressure grows for a much more active, aggressive, and greatly expanded U.S. combat role. As U.S. troop strength heads rapidly toward 75,000, even an ultimate figure of 100,000 is now considered too conservative; totals in the several-hundred-thousand range are quite casually kicked around.

As the number of troops expands, so will their mission. "We are on the verge of a whole new phase as far as American involvement is concerned," predicts one U.S. strategist. Deliberate Communist assaults on U.S. installations last February, he recalls, jolted the Johnson administration into bombing North Vietnam and landing the first U.S. combat troops for "combat support" duties well beyond the earlier advisory role. Until now, however, this has amounted largely to defensive action, with only occasional emergency assignments to relieve the pressure when regular South Vietnamese Army units felt an urgent need for help.

COMBAT ALLY

Now the idea is for U.S. forces to play the role increasingly of what one top officer calls "combat ally." Precisely how this will work is almost certainly to be the major subject for deliberations between local American and South Vietnamese authorities and the team of top policymakers due in from Washington Friday, including Secretary of Defense McNamara and Henry Cabot Lodge, scheduled to begin his second tour as Ambassador to Saigon shortly.

(In Washington yesterday, Defense Secretary McNamara told a press conference that his on-the-spot survey of Vietnam war needs might bring consideration of calling up military reserves, extending tours of duty, and increasing draft calls. A congressional delegation that saw him yesterday came away with the impression that the administration might ask Congress for a big new appropriation to finance Vietnam operations, even before the current session ends.)

Even before the high-level talks begin in South Vietnam, however, the broad outlines of the new U.S. role are almost certainly firmly fixed. In effect, the combat ally concept would turn U.S. troops into a force available much more routinely than now for duty in joint missions with South Vietnamese units or on special spoiling assignments

aimed at breaking up suspected concentrations of Vietcong before they can get themselves set for major offensives of their own.

Awed by the prospect of so much power to be brought to bear, one ranking U.S. officer exclaims: "I just don't see how we can really lose, when you look at the stuff we are bringing in here."

Most authorities would agree up to a point; no force the Communists could conceivably assemble seems likely to push U.S. coastal strongholds into the South China Sea.

But the question of whether American power can act fast enough remains the key to U.S. fortunes in Vietnam. The reason is all too evident in what you encounter in a 1,000-mile inspection of this confused and complicated battlefield: The hard fact is that while the United States is building up strength, the Vietcong are rapidly gobbling up huge chunks of South Vietnam.

VIETCONG GAINS

In short, they're winning the war. Hamlets and villages by the score are being overrun; strategic district towns are beginning to topple; the pressure is mounting on key provincial capitals, especially here in the soggy, desolate—but militarily critical—central highlands. Driving hundreds of refugees before them, the Reds are clogging coastal areas with displaced villagers, adding to already serious economic strains; Government figures at last count list over 500,000 fugitives. While U.S. bombers chop up communications in North Vietnam, Vietcong demolition teams are blasting bridges in the south; a simpler Red technique, the digging of deep trenches in key roads after nightfall, is also effective in shutting off transport of food and other necessities.

Result: With war weariness a common complaint, Saigon's will to resist is in constant danger of buckling under the military, economic, and political strain. Such a collapse could flow from a variety of causes—a stunning military reverse; a switch to the other side by a disheartened, or perhaps opportunistic, major South Vietnamese army unit; runaway inflation or an acute food shortage; a political coup predicated on peace at almost any price. Some knowledgeable U.S. experts don't even exclude the possibility of serious Communist penetration of the upper reaches of the Saigon Government, with all that could mean in the way of subtle sabotage of the war effort.

U.S. diplomats and soldiers both insist the outlook will brighten once the monsoon season ends and the United States-South Vietnamese "dry season" counterattack can be launched. But the trouble is that the rains will last for another 2 months at least, and the Vietcong offensive, by most reckoning, has yet to reach full ferocity.

AVERTING CALAMITY

Meantime, it's conceded that the U.S. military might, so heavily dependent on air-strike support and air transport, will be partially paralyzed. "We aren't even thinking in terms of reversing the trend right now," says one high-level American. "We would settle in the next few months for simply holding the line and averting calamity."

Even holding the line, however, is no easy task. To see why, you have only to head by helicopter up the chain of isolated outposts from the provincial capitals of Pleiku and Kontum here on the Vietnam high plateau and drop in at this tiny hamlet of Tan Canh, command post for the 42d Regiment of the South Vietnamese Army. Government forces at Tan Canh recently made a desperate effort to stem the Vietcong tide.

Circling down for a landing in the bright sunshine, you can visualize quite clearly the seesaw struggle that raged a few days earlier for the district town of Duc To, a mile or two down the road. On the face of it, it seems reasonable to score the fight as a Government success.

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The battle began with the familiar night assault by the Vietcong pouring out of the encircling jungle to overrun Dac To. When a relief column from regimental headquarters pushed out down the road, it bumped into the also familiar Vietcong ambush, carefully prepared behind a shoulder of land; the battalion-sized Government force was routed, the regimental commander killed.

Dac To's fall, however, would have made it four district towns in a row that have fallen to the Communists in recent weeks in the military region under the command of the South Vietnamese 2d Corps, and so it was decided the psychological impact might well be more than the area could bear. With only five battalions in reserve, corps commanders boldly yanked two of them out of the provincial capital of Kontum, airlifted them here to Tan Canh through a convenient break in the rain clouds, and launched a skillful thrust to retake Dac To.

A HOLLOW VICTORY

Confronted with overwhelming force, the Vietcong clashed briefly, with only two casualties, and melted back into the jungle. Since most of Dac To's citizens had scattered earlier, some of them to join the refugee stream to the bigger, better-protected towns, Dac To was largely deserted and its recapture a somewhat hollow victory. And as a visitor to Tan Canh watches a drenching downpour that blots out even the nearest hilltop and grounds his helicopter, it becomes all too apparent that even the limited victory achieved by the Government in the battle of Dac To was solely due to the fortuitous break in the weather. Much of the time at this period of the year rain would prevent the flying in of reinforcements, and Tan Canh and Dac To would be cut off from outside help. All road access has long since been cut by the Vietcong.

Food stocks at Tan Canh consist almost wholly of rice and salt and have dwindled to not much more than 10 days' supply. More critical is a shortage of gasoline, vitally needed for generators to keep radio communication open, and a skimpy reserve of helicopter fuel.

Encamped nearby in the thick, all-concealing jungle are a sizable Vietcong force and, by some intelligence estimates, as much as a regiment of the 325th Division of the People's Army of North Vietnam (PAVN), which the United States is sure was infiltrated into South Vietnam as an intact fighting unit earlier this year.

VIETCONG STRENGTH GROWS

The problem here, in short, is a microcosm of the problem everywhere in South Vietnam. According to tentative estimates by United States and South Vietnamese authorities, another PAVN division, the 304th, may also be either all the way into South Vietnam or at least en route along Laotian infiltration trails. Meantime, Vietcong strength is said by top U.S. officials to be roughly double that of only 4 or 5 months ago, a buildup roughly matching that of the United States.

The Vietcong, to be sure, have their problems, too. Their casualties are getting higher; in a typical week, they may well be double those of government forces. Recruitment in the countryside is growing more difficult; combat units report finding a far greater number of teenagers among Vietcong casualties and prisoners. In the Vietcong's haste to make the most of the monsoons, their tactics have also become tougher, most observers agree. Efforts to ingratiate have given way to rough stuff—terrorism, assassinations and pillage—in order to collar recruits and gather supplies from the local populace.

As a result, some authorities argue the insurrection might lose its steam if its big bid for victory falls short this year. "They can't keep up this pace for many more months," says one expert. "And these things are al-

ways hard to keep going once you have to crank them down."

The Saigon information ministry is already cooking up a special appeal designed to win over demoralized Vietcong after the monsoons. But the problem, of course, is to keep the war effort rolling and the Vietcong contained until then.

THE REFUGEE PROBLEM

The refugee influx, while not of crisis proportions now, could quickly become so. There are currently few signs of extreme hardship among the refugees. Under a government relief program, they actually receive almost twice as much in relief payments as the average Vietnamese earns, plus cash grants to resettle or simply spend as they see fit.

Food shortages and soaring prices could make the refugees' plight serious, however. Railroad lines as well as roads have been cut, and ships alone can't carry enough rice to refugees in the northern and central areas from the southern delta rice bowl. The United States has pitched in with an emergency call for extra cargo planes, but in some spots, such as Pleiku, the price of rice has doubled, eggs cost three times more than normal and kerosene is often unavailable for cooking.

If this trend continues, says veteran U.S. refugee expert Richard Evans, who is with the American aid mission in South Vietnam, "everybody becomes a refugee." And in that case the real calamity to fear—and the real payoff for the Vietcong's economic disruption campaign—would be a mass trek to the national capital for help. "You could have 5 or 10 million marching to Saigon," Mr. Evans warns.

Illegal monetary dealings as well as scarcity are fueling inflation, according to officials at the economic ministry. The heavy stream of U.S. dollars from free-spending American troops, the officials explain, is creating a market for greenbacks, thus bringing into the monetary supply funds which speculators previously have been sitting on because of the war's uncertainties.

HOARDING RICE

Rice merchants in Saigon and elsewhere are compounding the inflationary strain by hoarding in order to push prices up. The upshot is that the United States has been forced to rush 50,000 tons of rice to this traditionally rice-exporting nation. Because exports aren't earning as much as usual, the United States is also being asked for a boost in economic aid; Saigon's hard currency reserves, now down to \$100 million, are roughly half of normal.

Added to this economic stress is the usual quota of chronic political instability. It is a bit early to expect a move against the new government of Prime Minister Ky, but the Buddhists have scant enthusiasm for the war effort, and from their political citadel in the northern town of Hue they are already sniping at the Ky government, though their target for now is Catholic Chief of State Nguyen Van Thieu.

Buddhist leaders insist they are fervently anti-Communist and wholeheartedly against the Vietcong. But talks with them make it clear that their professed admiration for the U.S. buildup is based on the condition that it produce a quick and relatively easy victory.

Other question marks are the army's morale and manpower. "The thing to really watch for is if a whole battalion lays down its arms," says one high-ranking American.

Short of such a psychological blow, the South Vietnamese Army's dangerously thin reserves may lead to trouble. Those two battalions at Dac To, for example, are urgently needed for spot-relief chores elsewhere. "It's a gamble every time you shift them about," says one American adviser who sees an urgent need for U.S. forces to take over more of the reserve role. Hailling the apparent trend in

just that direction, he claims that only the ability to mass overwhelming force quickly against Vietcong concentrations can insure against the sort of military setback that might shatter popular and government morale.

Mr. MORSE. Mr. President, I yield to the Senator from West Virginia.

COLD WAR VETERANS' READJUSTMENT ASSISTANCE ACT

The Senate resumed the consideration of the bill (S. 9) to provide readjustment assistance to veterans who serve in the Armed Forces during the induction period.

Mr. RANDOLPH. Mr. President, I am grateful that the senior Senator from Oregon has given me the privilege to speak in the Senate at this time between the first address and the second address which he is to deliver this afternoon.

I speak again in support of the cold war Veterans' Readjustment Assistance Act. We know it as the cold war GI bill. My commendation is given to the distinguished Senator from Texas [Mr. YARBOROUGH], because he has persevered, has been most conscientious, and has manifested real leadership in advancing this vital measure in the Senate.

As we well know, the young men and women who have served in the Armed Forces since January 31, 1955, are not afforded the readjustment benefits which we as a grateful people in the United States provided for the veterans of World War II and the Korean war or conflict. However it may be designated, it was a battle in which Americans lost their lives. This discrimination cannot be justified on the basis of equality of service or on the importance of their endeavors to the national security of the United States.

On February 8, 1965, it was my responsibility to appear as a witness before the Subcommittee on Veterans Affairs of the Committee on Labor and Public Welfare to speak in favor of the pending bill, S. 9. It is interesting to note that less than 2 days before those hearings began, the United States intensified its efforts in Vietnam in retaliation for Vietcong assaults on two military compounds north of Saigon. Seven American lives were lost in that attack by the Communist forces. I wish to quote what I said during my appearance before the subcommittee in February:

We recall the events of the past few days to gain an understanding of their personal sacrifices. Seven American lives were lost in the Vietcong assault on two military compounds north of Saigon; and our young men, piloting 49 aircraft, were dispatched to retaliate and demonstrate that we intend to stand firm in the defense of the free world. One did not return. Our forces are presently at defense readiness condition there, which requires stricter security measures, additional manning requirements, and more individual units on alert in order to effect immediate response to any enlargement of the enemy activity.

What I said then, I would say today with this addition. It is my belief that we make a mistake when we seem to gloss over the seriousness—yes, even the tragedy—of the conflict in which we are now engaged in Vietnam.

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It is wrong for us to think in terms of the Vietnam conflict as a police action, one in which the United States is associated in counseling or advising. It is realistic that the people of the United States understand that American boys are losing their lives in the jungles of Vietnam. It is important that the people of the Nation understand this.

Eloquent testimony on this fact is found in a New York Journal-American article entitled, "A Gift for the Baby—Marine's Last Letter." This news story contains a letter from an 18-year-old marine to his expectant mother.

Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the article be printed in the Record at this point.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection it is so ordered.

A GIFT FOR THE BABY—MARINE'S LAST LETTER
(By James Connolly)

This is a story that tells itself. It's almost all here, in a letter received June 19 by Mrs. Gregory Risoldi of Claudia Street, Iselin, N.J., from her 18-year-old son, U.S. Marine Vincent Risoldi:

"Dear Mom: I guess you've had your baby already. Is it a boy or girl? I wonder if I'll ever know. But I've scraped together \$20, and here it is. Buy my little brother or sister something for me.

"I don't make too much money with this job I have now, and \$20 is all I can spare.

"You know, Mom, we were talking about me coming home for Christmas? Well, I want to tell you a little secret. I'm in Vietnam and I'm wondering if I'll ever get home. I really don't think so.

"It's hot here, very hot, day and night. You're got to look over your shoulder every time you talk to a friend. You've got to always be on the alert.

"These Vietcong, they pop up everywhere, take a few shots and run. But I'm here to help wipe out communism.

"By the way, if you see any of my friends down at the ice cream parlor or the drugstore, tell them I'm in Vietnam, and to get off their backsides and join the Marines.

"It is scary at night when you wait for them to come, but once the fight starts the only thing you think about is killing them before they kill you.

"Say hello to * * * everybody. Vinnie."

Mrs. Risoldi, who may have given birth to her sixth child by the time this story is being read, received a postscript—a telegram at 1:45 a.m. Tuesday.

Vincent has been killed in Vietnam.

Mr. RANDOLPH. Mr. President, I hope there will be no effort by anyone within the Government, at any level, in any agency, or in any position, to have the American people believe that we are engaged in other than actual fighting in Vietnam.

Mr. President, since those hearings in February our efforts, manpower, and weapons have been continually increasing in Vietnam. Ironically, as we begin this floor debate today, there are indications and talk that another intensified buildup is imminent. The President recently stated that "new and serious decisions will be necessary in the near future."

The Senator from Oregon has very cogently, and I think correctly, called to the attention of the Senate this afternoon the importance of these decisions which are being made.

The President has recently said:

Any substantial increase in the present level of our efforts to turn back the aggressors in South Vietnam will require steps to insure that reserves of men and equipment of the United States remain entirely adequate for any and all emergencies.

News reports inform us that the Vietnam Government has asked Secretary McNamara and Ambassador Lodge for a larger force. Reliable sources indicate that the Joint Chiefs of Staff have recommended the total of U.S. troops in Vietnam be increased from the scheduled 75,000 to 179,000. I say to the Members of the Senate this is a serious crisis—and we are looking to the American man-at-arms for his services. He has not forsaken the people of the United States in the past. As long as we are engaged in a struggle in Vietnam, he, of course, will not forsake the American people now. It is a question, sometimes, of whether we forsake the veteran.

Indeed, we owe a debt to the men who are risking their lives in the jungles of Vietnam, or on airborne alert in the Strategic Air Command, or maintaining the combat readiness of our ICBM and Nike missile sites, or patrolling the high seas to protect the world from Communist aggression. We do an injustice in calling them peacetime veterans. That is a misnomer, Mr. President. They are, in all good conscience and hard fact, entitled to comparable adjustment benefits accorded their predecessors.

I cannot use language too strong to point this out. I am certain that in the Senate we can bring this measure to an affirmative vote.

In terms of a pragmatic justification of the bill under discussion, we have available the fruits derived from the World War II and Korean GI bills. As the Senator from Texas [Mr. YARBOROUGH] cogently pointed out on many occasions almost 11 million veterans have advanced their educational and vocational qualifications under the prior adjustment assistance acts. We discussed this topic in the Subcommittee on Education of the Committee on Labor and Public Welfare. At this point I express not only my appreciation but also that of all Senators and the American people for the leadership which has been given to the cause of education, in this, and in prior Congresses, by the Senator from Oregon [Mr. MORSE], the chairman of the Subcommittee on Education.

Though the benefits of such education and the resultant increase in human skills cannot be measured with mathematical precision, we know that the additional earning power achieved by veterans from these programs returns more than a billion dollars a year in taxes to the Federal Treasury, an annual return which has insured full payment of the initial investment. A cold war GI bill aimed at developing the talents of the post Korean veterans who will number over 5 million by 1970, would realize similar, if not greater, profits than those which have accrued to the veterans and to our entire economy under previous veterans' legislation.

In our State of West Virginia over 220,000 veterans have availed themselves of the opportunities of previous legisla-

tion and of these some 22,000 are engaged in the fields of medicine, teaching, engineering, and science. Certainly the beneficial effects of past legislation to which I have called attention demonstrate that American life has been improved by the programs which have been enacted.

In the interest of equity for the individuals affected and in furthering the economic and social well-being of this Nation as a whole, I earnestly support the pending proposal. It is my sincere hope that the Senate will act favorably on S. 9, so that it will become law in this session of the Congress. Let us not be guilty of those lines inscribed on an ancient sentry box in Gibraltar:

God and the soldier—all men adore
In time of trouble and no more:
For when war is over, and all things
righted,
God is neglected—the old soldier slighted.

For the House
U.S. POLICY IN VIETNAM

Mr. MORSE. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent to have printed at the conclusion of my speech on foreign policy, an article published in this morning's Wall Street Journal dealing with the war in Vietnam, entitled "Gloom in Vietnam: Doubts Rise That United States Can Move Fast Enough To Blunt Reds' Drive—American Strength Increases, but Communists Continue To Gobble Up Territory—A Hollow Victory at Da Nang."

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.

(See exhibit No. 2.)

Mr. MORSE. Mr. President, this is a story which bears out the view that was received from so many intelligence forces to the effect that we are engaging ourselves in a long-bogged-down endeavor in Asia that will be terrifically costly in blood and money.

Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that I may yield to the Senator from Hawaii for an insertion in the Record without losing my right to the floor.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.

The Senator from Hawaii is recognized.

LEONARD MARKS TO BE NAMED DIRECTOR OF THE U.S. INFORMATION AGENCY

Mr. INOUE. Mr. President, on Tuesday President Johnson announced he intended to nominate Leonard Marks, of Washington, D.C., to be Director of the U.S. Information Agency, succeeding the Honorable Carl Rowan.

Mr. Marks is an attorney with a long interest in international communications, and is well known to me and to many other Members of the Senate. His qualifications for this position are outstanding, and the President is to be congratulated for nominating him.

The world stands today on the threshold of a communications revolution. And it is essential that the U.S. Information Agency have at its head a man competent to guide it carefully and wisely through that revolution.